Italian foreign policy towards Middle East before, during and after the Six-Day War

Before the war

Throughout the Fifties, Italian foreign policy towards the Middle East was marked by an ambiguous attitude, which often manifested itself as immobilism. Concerns with not altering ties with Arab countries, with which political and mainly economic relations were being kept - one must consider the oil supply - went hand in hand with concerns with keeping good relations with the new State of Israel which, in terms of mentality, culture and lifestyle was much closer to the Italian spirit than Arab countries.((Tremolada, Ilaria (2003) All'ombra degli arabi. Milano M&B Publishing))

The Italian attitude towards this area essentially did not change when, in 1963, the first centre-leftist government succeeded its centre-rightist predecessors. While, on the one hand, during the early sixties, Italy showed signs of economic recovery and had a dense network of commercial relations with Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, on the other hand the prevalence of problems on the home front policy continued to bring about a lesser foreign policy.((Varsori, A (1998) L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992 .Roma-Bari, Laterza, pg. 156))

The diplomatic opening of the new government in the Middle East was marked by an Israeli initiative. In February 1964, the Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir left for a journey to Paris and Rome, aiming at speeding up negotiations between Israel and the European Economic Community, with the objective of institutionalizing relations (...) and reaching a favourable position compared to North African and Spanish competitors, all countries which held a deeply anti-Israel approach.((Riccardi, Luca (2006) Il Problema Israele. Milano, Guerrini e Associati, p. 188)) Italy, which saw in Israel a dangerous competitor for agricultural exports, had no intentions of engaging in long-term trade commitments. Despite the reasons for the visit, on the said occasion Golda Meir decided not to insist vis a vis the Italian interlocutor on strictly economic matters. Instead, she shifted the focus of the talks to the topic of security, and pointed out that Israel was compelled to vast military expenditure to prevent any kind of attack on her. For his part, Italian prime minister Aldo Moro also had an interest in finding mutual points of understanding during those negotiations. He showed interest in knowing the position of the USSR towards the Middle East, a position that Golda Meir defined as accounting, USSR support the Arabs because they are many.(( Riccardi, op. cit. p. 191))

It is interesting to note how, at the end of the visit, the Italian foreign ministry pointed out with relief that the Israeli minister had not brought forward any requests with regards to economic relations". Italy wanted to retain friendly, but superficial relations with the young state of Israel.((Ibid))

Two months after that meeting, in April 1964, the new Italian foreign minister Saragat went to Cairo on an official visit. There he met with top government officials, to whom he pointed out that this was the first international engagement of the new government after the ones with major Western allies. Naturally, the main divergences emerged in matters concerning Egyptian policy towards Israel, in spite of which, however, the Italian foreign ministry decided to give a positive interpretation of the meeting. (..) we got a positive impression, we felt a more moderate attitude towards Israel.(( Ferraris, Luigi Vittoro (1996) Manuale della politica estera italiana 1947-1993. Roma-Bari:Laterza, p. 168))

1964 was also the year when Lyndon Johnson took office at the White House and there were changes in US foreign policy towards Israel. The young Jewish state could, at last, show its Arab enemies that it was no longer isolated, but had on its side the most important leader among Western nations.((Shlaim, Avi  (2003) Il muro di ferro. Israele e il mondo arabo. Bologna: Il Ponte, pp. 260, 261)) The United States wanted to keep an apparently moderate foreign policy in the Middle East, in order to avoid negative repercussions both in the Arab world - especially by those who did not identify with Nasserism and its position - and in the Soviet bloc. For this reason, they decided to supply weapons to Israel (tanks in this case) via indirect ways. Weapons reached their destination through various Nato countries, mainly Germany via Italy - where the transaction, however, had to remain absolutely confidential. As Peres said: Only three people - Defence Minister Andreotti, his intelligence chief and the deputy intelligence chief would be informed of the ultimate tank destination. Also in the following months Israel continued to assert the advisability of keeping Italian involvement to the minimum, as it held that the Arab claim kept taking its toll on Italian policy.((Riccardi, op cit p. 196))

During the war

When Egyptian president Nasser, on 17th May 1967, asked the United Nations to evacuate its peacekeepers, who had been deployed in Sinai since the end of the 1956 Suez Crisis, Fanfani pointed out to the Egyptian ambassador the concerns of the Italian government.

The answer he got was: It's Israel that threatens Syria.

On 22nd May, Nasser announced the decision of closing the Straits of Tiran to ships sailing to and from Israel. To the Italian foreign minister, it was a clear sign that this step could have been the point of no return in the crisis. On 23rd May, Fanfani reconfirmed in parliament that his policy in dealing with the crisis was based on "advice of moderation and wisdom directed to all parties involved, but above all it was based on the unconditional support to the activity of mediation that UN Secretary General U. Thant was about to engage in. This was the first manifestation of what was to become the Italian position during and after the war: to go along the way of common security, entrusting the UN with solving the crisis.((Tosi, Luciano (2003)  L'Italia e la cooperazione internazionale nel Mediterraneo. Bologna: Il Mulino. p. 184)) – This choice was the only possible compromise among the different components of the government majority: the Christian Democratic party, which was traditionally pro-Arab, the Socialists together with the Republican parties, who were closer to Israel's position.

On the same day, 23rd May, Fanfani also met with the Israeli ambassador, who delivered a personal message from Abba Eban: Israel would have reacted to the first Egyptian attempt to stop an Israeli ship or a ship from a different country carrying strategic material sailing to Israel by attacking the United Arab Republic: (...) the Israeli Government, concerned with the massing of Egyptian forces at the border, was considering the launch of a preventive attack against them.((Minute of the conversation between  the Italian  min.  and the Israeli ambassador,  in Riccardi, op.  cit. p. 207)) The Israeli diplomat did not do anything to alleviate the concerns of the Italian minister, who asked him in any case to persuade his government not to "accomplish any hasty actions".

During the same time, UN Secretary-General U Thant started his own peace mission in Cairo; Fanfani showed his support to the initiative and urged him to emphasize the good name of Italy, which had been the only Mediterranean country to supply Egypt with a considerable assistance, also in financial terms.((Minute of the meeting between the Italian  min. and UN Secretary General, in Riccardi, op. cit. p. 208))

Great Britain, with the backing of the United States of America, suggested the implementation of an emergency plan in order to offer protective passage of merchant ships towards the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran (Declaration of Maritime Nations). Fanfani responded to this suggestion stating that Italian adherence would be unlikely, because the policy adopted by Italy in its activity of moderation was in the sense of seeing détente within the framework of the United Nations.((Note by the Min. Fanfani, in Riccardi, op. cit.  p. 209))

Between the end of May and the beginning of June, Fanfani, who firmly believed that Italy should still present itself to the Arab countries as a trustworthy interlocutor, met in Rome with Syria foreign minister Makhos. On this occasion, he reconfirmed that any decision was to be taken within the UN and then urged Iraq foreign minister Al Pachachi to go to the UN in order to attempt a diplomatic action that contributed to avoiding the conflict.

On 29th May, he met again with the Israeli ambassador in order to inform him of his actions of mediation. Avriel was not particularly impressed; he thanked Fanfani but reasserted that, by prolonging the wait, Israel could have lost the advantages of the initiative.((Note by the  Min. Fanfani, in Riccardi, op. cit. p. 211))

The intensification of the Middle Eastern crisis had also ignited a political debate on the home front. Public opinion was mostly pro-Israel, while political parties held more complex positions. The Communist Party declared its support to anti- imperialist Arab movements; in the government majority- as we wrote - the Republicans supported Israel unconditionally, while the Socialists were partly pro-Israel and partly supportive of Fanfani and of the Christian Democrats who were pro-Arab.

On 5th June, after the war had started, Israeli prime minister Levi Eshkol had a letter delivered to Italian prime minister Aldo Moro, in which he informed the latter of the beginning of the operations and indirectly criticized the policy of the Italian government: In the past weeks I have received several pleas to show patience and restraint.(...) our restraint has been of no use.

On 6th June, the Israeli embassy informed the Italian government, with the clear intent of notifying the Vatican, that instructions had been given to troops fighting in the Jerusalem area to avoid damages to holy places at all costs, and to take all possible measures to avoid damages to the said places by Jordanian forces.(( Note by the Min. in Riccardi, op. cit.  p. 214))

In those days, Italy continued to engage in undertakings aimed at activating some kind of international intervention that would halt the fighting. Besides ineffectively calling on the parties to stop the hostilities, Italy also took a step towards the UN Security Council.

Fanfani tried to put pressure also on Egypt, whose new ambassador was being welcomed in Rome for the first time on 6th June.

The Italian minister pointed out to the Egyptian diplomat how a certain Arab propaganda about the destruction and massacre of the Israeli people" produced bewilderment in the Italian and international public opinion, and urged Egypt to avoid escalating the tensions.

The Olympian impartiality((Casalegno, Carlo Israele, nostra frontiera in Panorama, 1 june  1967, now availble in   Israele  giustizia e liberta', Roma, Carrocci  1980 p. 38)) of the foreign minister, which had been tolerated by those supporting Israel within the government prior to the start of the hostilities, in the days of the war was being openly challenged by the socialist Nenni, who sided with conviction with Israel. President Sagarat was also in agreement with Nenni, and saw in this war a victory of intelligence (the Israelis) over numbers(the Arabs).((Tosi, Luciano (2003) L'Italia e la cooperazione internazionale nel Mediterraneo. Bologna: Il Mulino p. 185))

On 7th June, Fanfani once again reasserted in Parliament the neutrality of the Italian government, but on that occasion and in that delicate moment he put forward the issue of the Palestinian Arabs, as his thought was guided by  a strong sense of human and social justice and respect of single individuals and peoples((Ferraris, op. Cit. p. 169)).  It is very likely that the term "peoples" had been added to "individuals" with a very specific intent  (.....) mentioning a people implies the recognition of rights, including those of a political nature.((Ibid p. 169))

According to those supporting Israel within the government (PRI and PSU), this was a hidden way to uphold the Arab cause.((Caviglia, D (2005)  La politica dell'Italia e il conflitto arabo-israeliano Nuova Storia Contemporanea, p. 18)) Once the war had started, they felt Israel should be considered as a member of the Western world suffering the attacks of USSR-backed dictatorships. Fanfani's opponents, moreover, believed that he had made a mistake by not adopting fully an Atlantic policy, of which the defence of Israel was an integral part. He had wanted to escape the difficulties of the cold war, but the outbreak of the conflict and the overwhelming victory of Israel questioned his political choices.

The stance taken by Fanfani was very different from that of the Italian president, who had repeatedly expressed his pro-Israel views. This very stance fuelled rumours about Fanfani's resignation, which prime minister Moro tried to thwart.((Riccardi, op. cit.  p. 221))